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Abstract 
We conducted a salient purchasing experiment to test if an information intervention alters fizzy 
drinks demand. Subjects in our experiment initially made five rounds of purchases, for 14 items 
(energy drinks, colas, and lemonades) selected from a stratified sample of retailers. Subjects 
faced seven pricing environments, reflecting baseline prices, two ad valorem taxes, two specific 
taxes, and ad valorem and specific price cuts to reflect retailer discounting. Subjects then 
watched a video presentation by celebrity chef Jamie Oliver, which highlighted adverse health 
effects of sugary drinks. The five rounds of choices were then repeated, to generate within-
subject before and after demands that show an overall 25% reduction in purchases due to the 
information intervention. Demand for one sugar-free option, Diet Coke, rose 36% after the 
intervention. The impacts under baseline prices were little different to those seen in conjunction 
with tax-induced price rises. Effects of the information intervention were larger for females, for 
the young, for the less educated, for those usually spending more on soft drinks, and for those 
who usually ignore sugar content when making purchases.  
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I. Introduction 
The focus of policymakers and researchers concerned about health effects of sugar-sweetened 
beverage (SSB) consumption is mainly on fiscal measures, like soda taxes, rather than on 
information interventions. Over 20 countries now have some form of soda tax, including France, 
Mexico, Norway, and the U.K. (Baker et al, 2017). The World Health Organization suggest 
taxes to raise retail price of SSBs at least 20% will reduce consumption proportionately (WHO, 
2016). Less attention is paid to information interventions, such as health warnings, despite the 
evidence from tobacco control that such warnings promote smoking cessation and discourage 
youth uptake (see Hammond, 2011, for a review of this evidence). 
 Information interventions may be as effective as taxes in moderating SSB consumption, 
for two reasons. First, predicted effects of soda taxes often rely on studies that ignore responses 
that mediate how price rises translate into changes in quantity consumed. The first response is 
stocking. If consumers buy when prices are temporarily lower and stockpile to consume later, 
the own-price elasticity of quantity demand for soda is exaggerated up to 60% if this response 
is ignored (Wang, 2015). The second response is within-group quality substitution, if higher 
prices cause consumers to switch to cheaper variants, like discount brands and larger containers. 
Gibson and Romeo (2017) and Gibson and Tucker (2018) show that if lower spending due to 
adjusting quality is misinterpreted as a quantity response, own-price elasticities of quantity 
demand for SSBs are overstated by as much as two- to three-fold. Andalón and Gibson (2018) 
find a similar overstatement, which flows through to overstated predictions of body mass 
reductions and health effects from Mexico’s peso-per-liter soda tax. 
 Second, information interventions seem to have large and persistent effects in reducing 
SSB purchases, albeit with few studies of actual demands (but many of hypothetical demands). 
For example, Bleich et al (2014) intervened by posting 8.511 inch signs with one of four types 
of caloric information about SSBs (total calories, teaspoons of sugar, and the running or 
walking needed to work off a bottle of soda) on display cases holding beverages, and observed 
a fall in the rate of regular soda sales of about one-third, while sales of diet soda and water rose 
significantly. The effects persisted even after the signs were removed. Likewise, in Berkeley, 
soda sales fell over 10% after the 2014 election that saw a winning vote for a soda tax measure, 
even though the tax was not imposed until several months later (and not passed into SSB prices 
on campus until a year later, yet regular soda sales fell on campus while diet soda sales rose, 
even with no price change). Taylor et al (2019) suggest this pattern reflects information effects 
from the media coverage of the election campaign. 
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 An issue with observational settings is that anticipatory responses, like stocking, and 
spillovers, if information spreads, may also affect demand. A laboratory experiment gives clean 
evidence on effects of an intervention because all other factors can be held constant. Therefore, 
we carried out an experiment to see how an information intervention affects SSB demand. 
Subjects in our experiment initially made five rounds of purchases, for 14 beverages (energy 
drinks, colas, and lemonades) in seven pricing environments. Subjects then watched a video 
presentation by celebrity chef Jamie Oliver highlighting adverse health effects of SSBs. The 
five rounds of choices were then repeated, to generate within-subject before and after demands. 
The quantity purchased fell by up to 50% for some SSBs after exposure to the information. 
Demand for one sugar-free option, Diet Coke, rose 36% after the intervention. Impacts under 
baseline prices were little different to those seen in conjunction with tax-induced price rises. 
Our use of the term “experiment” follows standard use in economics, because we rely 
on directly observable salient behavioral responses, rather than on answers to hypothetical 
questions. Subjects faced real consequences of their choices, with one of the ten rounds and 
one of the seven price structures randomly chosen to pay out on the experimental demands. 
Many subjects left our laboratory carrying drinks that resulted from their actual purchase 
decisions. In contrast, most prior studies use hypothetical situations, even if authors title their 
studies ‘experimental’ (e.g. Bollard et al, 2016). These studies typically use online surveys to 
see if graphic warnings (e.g. with pictures of dental caries) or plain packaging affect self-
reported SSB purchase intentions (Billich et al, 2018). However, because “talk is cheap” if 
there are no real behavioral consequences (Galizzi and Wiesen, 2017), the fact that these 
studies find that warning labels can cut hypothetical SSB demand by almost 60% is no real 
help for policymakers. 
 The next section briefly reviews related research using experiments. We describe our 
experiment and the information intervention in Section 3. In Section 4 we report the results, 
relying especially on within-subject before and after comparisons to get at causal effects of the 
intervention. Section 5 has the conclusions. 
II. A Brief Review of Related Experiments  
A growing literature uses experiments to estimate effects of price manipulation and information 
interventions on food and beverage consumption decisions.1 Some studies use laboratory, field 
or virtual experiments to collect consumption decisions in environments of supermarkets 
                                      
1 See Epstein et al. (2012) and Wilson et al. (2016) for selective reviews. 
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(Epstein et al, 2015; Velema et al, 2017), or cafeterias and restaurants (Horgen and Brownell, 
2002; Michels et al, 2008; Giesen et al., 2011; Streletskaya et al, 2014). Some studies have 
potentially problematic design issues because they either involve only hypothetical scenarios, 
have few or very small price changes, or have no budget constraints to restrain purchases. 
Yang and Chiou (2010) account for some of these issues in their laboratory experiment, 
in a 22 design with health information and drink price as treatment variables. Subjects in the 
information treatment were primed with an article discussing obesity issues relating to sugary 
beverages and the importance of healthy diet. Participants sampled a selection of four healthy 
and unhealthy beverages, ranked their preferences, and then could purchase their most favored 
healthy and unhealthy beverage at five different price levels, using a $7 endowment. Choices 
at one price level were selected randomly to be realized. Yang and Chiou find that providing 
health information promotes substitution away from unhealthy beverages.   
Streletskaya et al (2014) also use a 22 design, simulating a cafeteria environment with 
a single price change (an unhealthy food tax and healthy food subsidy) and information in the 
form of anti-obesity and healthy food advertising. Participants were given a $10 voucher to 
spend on a lunch menu that had both healthy and unhealthy options. Prior to their consumption 
decisions, participants viewed a television show with advertisements specific to their treatment. 
Subjects made consumption decisions across six treatments, with one selected randomly to be 
realized. A combined unhealthy food tax and anti-obesity advertisements promoted healthier 
choices, while a subsidy and advertisements favoring healthy foods had little effect. There was 
no effect of anti-obesity advertisements by themselves. 
While designs of the two papers discussed above address some issues that plague other 
experiments in this area, there are still potential problems.2 Neither study let subjects keep 
unspent portions of their endowment, and so there are no opportunity costs of decisions. There 
was also no procedure to ensure that products were representative of daily consumption options 
available to subjects, and baseline prices were not chosen to match purchasing options outside 
the laboratory. Finally, there was no baseline treatment without priming. Our experimental 
design addresses all of these potential problems. 
III. Methods 
3.1 Overview 
Our experimental design builds upon Gibson and Tucker (2018) that examined quality and 
                                      
2 Fischer (2014) discusses problems with the Streletskaya et al (2014) experimental design. 
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quantity responses to price changes for fizzy soft drinks. A feature of the current experiment is 
the provision of health-related information, which was not previously considered. 
3.2 Products 
To ensure we used representative items, we surveyed a nearby supermarket (a 20 minute walk 
from the laboratory), local convenience stores, and all outlets on campus. The supermarket had 
160 specifications of fizzy drinks and the convenience stores had 104 specifications. Prices 
averaged NZ$5.30 per liter (SD=$2.80 per liter).3 The range on campus was more limited, with 
just 12 specifications, priced higher (average $8.60 per liter). We selected 21 items with 
probability proportional to size (the count of items on shelf display) from the combined 
supermarket and convenience store frames. After pre-testing, we dropped items larger than one 
liter, which were awkward for student subjects to carry to classes after the lab sessions.4  
Table 1 describes the 14 items we use, which include six energy drinks, five colas, and 
three other soft drinks (a ‘lemonades’ group). The mean unit price is $6.00 per liter (SD=$2.20). 
We lack bulky (hence, cheaper) items but otherwise our products are representative. The last 
three columns of Table 1 show purchase occasions in the experiment, the number of units 
bought, and the share of spending for each item. Our experiment generated n=5,143 purchases 
with just over 10,000 units bought, with multiple-unit purchases especially for single cans of 
energy drinks (Mother, V, Lift+) and a discount cola (Classic Cola). Overall, 63% of total 
spending was on energy drinks, 21% on colas, and the remainder on lemonades. 
 (Table 1 about here) 
3.3 Subjects 
The 110 subjects were recruited university-wide. The median age was 24 years, 45% were 
male, 80% were undergraduates, and median education was 15 years. Their mean weekly 
spending was $8 on fizzy drinks (median $5), out of $250 per week total spending. 
3.4 Experiment 
The experiment took place in the Waikato Experimental Economics Laboratory (WEEL), that 
allows private decision-making. We ran sessions over five months from late 2017. The sessions 
typically lasted just over one hour to go over instructions, complete a background survey, make 
the initial choices over five rounds of the experiment, watch the video, have another five rounds 
of choices, and finally receive in-kind and in-cash payments.  
                                      
3 At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate averaged NZD$1=USD$0.71. 
4 The decreases in quantity purchased due to the information intervention that we report below may be lower 
bounds to effects that would occur in the field, given that the larger (and cheaper) items were not considered. 
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 Subjects were given an endowment of cash each round, which stochastically varied 
from $18 to $24 with mean $21. The individual endowment was private information and the 
distribution of endowments was not revealed to subjects. The prices also (slightly) varied 
stochastically by round, to reflect the distribution of prices observed across outlets.  
 Within each round, subjects made purchase decisions under seven pricing schemes: 
one reflects the baseline prices, two reflect price rises from ad valorem taxes of 20% and 40%, 
two reflect price rises from excise taxes of 50 cents and $1 per liter, and two are price cuts of 
20% and 50 cents per liter, which were included in case responses are not symmetric when 
prices rise and fall. To guard against framing effects, we did not refer at any point to taxes; the 
pricing schemes were simply numbered as #1 to #7. To guard against ordering effects, subjects 
saw all seven pricing schemes on a single decision screen that displayed the matrix of prices 
for all schemes and for all drinks in that round.  
Subjects could work in any order they liked, but for each scheme they had to open a 
pop-up interface, shown in Figure 1. Within this pop-up, they could spend as much (up to the 
value of their daily endowment) or as little on drinks as they liked. The pop-up listed the prices 
for each drink under the current pricing scheme and had input boxes to enter the number of 
units they wanted to purchase (e.g. 10 cans of Classic Cola in Figure 1). These input boxes 
were aligned with pictures of each product, and the 14 drinks were available for viewing at the 
front of the laboratory, presented in the same order as on the screen.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
3.5 Incentives 
After all subjects made their purchase choices, one round and one pricing scheme were selected 
using a bingo cage. Transactions from that round became the realized decisions. Subjects were 
then called back to the payment room, one at a time, to privately receive their purchased drinks 
and any residual cash. The combined in-kind and in-cash remuneration was worth $22, on 
average. This is just under 10% of median weekly spending on food, drink, and rent.  
3.6 Information Intervention  
After the 5th round, subjects privately watched a ten minute excerpt from Jamie’s Sugar Rush, 
a 50-minute documentary on sugar’s role in health problems like obesity and Type II diabetes, 
released by celebrity chef Jamie Oliver in 2015. The excerpt highlighted the amount of sugar 
in fizzy drinks, and focused on consequences of high soda consumption in Mexico and the 
U.K.. The full documentary also discusses soda taxes in Mexico and Jamie Oliver’s restaurant 
surcharge on drinks with added sugar but we omitted those parts to ensure that the information 
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provided was focused on health consequences of SSB consumption. After watching the video, 
subjects answered qualitative questions related to awareness of material in the documentary 
and then had a further five rounds of purchases, where the endowments and prices they had 
faced in rounds 1-5 were repeated. Thus, we have within-subject before and after comparisons, 
where the only factor that changed is awareness of some health consequences of consuming 
fizzy drinks. 
IV. Results 
After watching the Sugar Rush video, demand declined sharply. The evolution of the total 
number of purchases (in panel a) and the total spending on drinks (in panel b) across ten rounds 
of the experiment is shown in Figure 2. There is no trend in either series, from Round 1 to 
Round 5, or again from Round 6 to Round 10. However, there is a sharp discontinuity, with a 
28% drop in the number of purchases and a 24% drop in the total spending, between the first 
five and second five rounds. The only difference between these two sets of five rounds was the 
introduction of the new information, in the Sugar Rush video. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 In Table 2 we exploit the paired nature of the within-subject change our experiment 
allows. We consider three decisions subjects faced: whether to take up a purchase opportunity; 
what quantity to purchase; and, the total spending on drinks. We present results by type of 
drink, and also by individual item for colas, which received a lot of attention in the Jamie Oliver 
video (e.g., with footage of babies in Mexico drinking Coca Cola). Our interest is in the 
unconditional averages, before and after watching the Sugar Rush video. These capture demand 
changes on both the extensive and intensive margins and are the statistic of interest for policy 
makers concerned with reducing population intake of sugar. The statistical significance of the 
difference between the pre-video and post-video averages is then examined with a paired t-test.  
(Table 2 about here) 
 Across all purchase opportunities (for 14 drinks and seven pricing structures), subjects 
made a purchase on 5.6% of occasions (SE=1.0%) in the first five rounds. This rate fell to 4.0% 
after watching the video and the difference of 1.6 percentage points is precisely estimated 
(SE=0.1 percentage points). In proportionate terms, watching the video caused a 29% decrease 
in the odds of purchasing fizzy drinks. The unconditional average quantity purchased was 48ml 
before the video and 36ml after the video (a 25% reduction), while unconditional average 
spending fell from 25 cents to 19 cents (a 24% reduction).  
 The reduction in the likelihood of a purchase was largest for regular colas, declining 
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by 3.2 percentage points, or 45% of the pre-video level. The demand for two sugar-free colas 
showed contrasting patterns; the probability of purchasing Diet Coke rose, while it fell by 
2.4 percentage points (37% of the pre-video level) for Pepsi Max. Notably, the “no sugar” 
statement on the Pepsi Max can is much more discretely placed (with a far smaller font) than 
the word “Diet” on a Diet Coke can, so subjects may have thought of Pepsi Max as regular cola 
(given that we were replicating information environments in typical shopping scenarios, we 
provided no additional information pertaining to which drinks were sugar-free and which were 
not). Apart from Diet Coke, the energy drinks had the smallest reductions in demand after 
subjects had watched the video, with the odds of a purchase falling 21%. 
 The remaining two panels of Table 2 show the effect of the intervention on the quantity 
of soft drinks purchased, and on total spending on these drinks. There was a shift in demand 
towards Diet Coke, whose average quantity purchased rose by 7ml while demand for the other 
colas was 42ml lower; in proportionate terms this represented a 36% rise in demand for Diet 
Coke while demand for the other colas fell by 47%. The energy drinks were the category whose 
demand was least affected by the information intervention; quantity purchased and spending 
fell by just 16%. Notably, energy drinks were not highlighted in the Sugar Rush video. 
 The results reported in Table 3 consider how the demand reductions after watching the 
video varied with the different pricing structures. At baseline prices, which reflected prices in 
local off-campus outlets, there was a 34% fall in the probability of a purchase, a 30% fall in 
the quantity purchased and a 29% fall in spending. The proportionate reductions in purchase 
odds were slightly larger when prices reflected a 20% ad valorem tax but in an environment 
with even higher prices, from a 40% ad valorem tax, demand falls after watching the video 
were slightly less than at baseline prices. If the pricing environment had specific taxes, the 
impact of the video on demand was a little less than with either ad valorem taxes or at baseline 
prices, especially for the quantity purchased.5 However, the variation due to either type of tax 
compared to the effect seen with baseline prices is fairly small. A reasonable summation is that 
effects of the information intervention at baseline prices are little different to those seen in 
conjunction with tax-induced price rises. 
(Table 3 about here) 
 Two other notable features in Table 3 are the asymmetric responses to price cuts versus 
                                      
5 In addition to looking along rows of Table 3, to see impacts of the information intervention, looking down the 
first column corroborates a finding of Sharma et al (2014) that volumetric tax may reduce quantity consumed by 
more than an equivalent ad valorem tax (as seen from the lower demand with a $1 per liter tax than a 20% tax). 
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rises, and a tax-induced price structure with similarly suppressed demand as for the information 
intervention. At baseline prices, watching the video caused purchase probabilities to drop two 
percentage points, and mean quantity purchased fell by 15ml. These effects are most similar to 
the pre-video results where prices reflect a specific tax of $0.50 per liter, which could be 
considered the tax-equivalent value of the information intervention. With price cuts of either 
20% ad valorem or $0.50 per liter, demand rose, in terms of purchase probabilities and 
quantities, by more than twice as much as the fall in demand with taxes of either 20% or $0.50 
per liter. One consequence of the large demand response to price cuts is that the proportionate 
reduction in demand due to watching the video is smaller than under other pricing structures 
because of the higher level of pre-video demand.6 
 There was considerable heterogeneity in the effects of the information intervention, 
which is highlighted in Table 4. In terms of demographic characteristics, the effects of the 
information intervention were larger for females, for the young, and for the less educated. In 
each case, we use a difference-in-differences strategy by contrasting the within-subject before 
and after comparison of demands for two mutually exclusive groups. For example, the odds of 
a female subject purchasing a soft drink fell by 2.3 percentage points after the video, while for 
males the fall was only by 0.7 percentage points (with a t-statistic of 8.22 for the difference in 
the differences). Likewise, subjects who were below the median age reduced their quantity 
purchased by 16ml after the video, while older subjects cut average demand by only 9ml, and 
the gap for the less educated versus the more educated was almost as large. 
(Table 4 about here) 
 In addition to demographics, we also considered three behavioral-related variables that 
may be relevant to the effect of the information intervention: whether the typical amount spent 
on soft drinks was above the median of $5 per week (“buy more soda”); whether the subject 
typically considered sugar content when making purchases (“check sugar”); and, whether the 
subject rated the Jamie’s Sugar Rush video as likely to change their future consumption 
decisions (“video would alter”) where this rating was made immediately after seeing the video 
but before having the chance to make purchases in Rounds 6 to 10. There was a larger effect 
of the information intervention on subjects who typically buy more soda, reducing their odds 
of buying and their average quantity by twice as much as for the “buy less soda” group. There 
                                      
6 The asymmetry is not because taxes do not apply to the two sugar-free drinks, to consider effects of a SSB tax 
rather than a soda tax, while price decreases applied to all drinks, to mimic temporary discounting by stores. 
Redoing Table 3 without the sugar-free drinks, the purchase probability and quantity response to price cuts is 
still twice as large as the response to price increases. 
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were also significantly larger effects of the intervention on subjects who usually ignore sugar 
content when making purchases, with t-statistics for the difference-in-differences which ranged 
from 2.1 to 2.9 for the three types of decisions shown in Table 4. The subjects who said that 
the information in the video would affect their future consumption did indeed show this, with 
their reduction in spending, in quantity bought, and in odds of purchasing being from two to 
three times larger than for the subjects who felt that the information would not change their 
future consumption decisions (“video not alter”). 
V. Conclusions 
Compared to attention paid to fiscal measures, like soda taxes, there is far less evidence on how 
information interventions alter demand for sugar-sweetened beverages. This is despite the key 
role of health warnings in reducing smoking. Apart from the intriguing result of Taylor et al 
(2019), that information from the Berkeley soda tax debate, rather than price changes per se, 
seemed to reduce demand for regular soda demand and raise demand for diet soda, there is 
little research by economists on effects of information on soda demand. While there is public 
health research on this topic, it is mostly for hypothetical demands, and typically uses online 
surveys, and thus does not provide a firm foundation for guiding policymakers. 
 To contribute to this gap in the literature, we designed an incentivized laboratory 
experiment, where the within-subject before and after design lets us see how exposure to health 
information affects demand for fizzy soft drinks. The health information was given in a style 
likely to be salient for young people, drawing on a documentary presented by the celebrity chef 
Jamie Oliver. We find that quantity purchased fell by up to 50% for some SSBs after exposure 
to this information, while demand for one sugar-free option, Diet Coke, rose 36%. The fall in 
demand due to the information intervention is about the same as the response to a $0.50 per 
liter excise tax. The impacts of the information intervention were largely unchanged if prices 
were raised moderately by taxes, but became smaller at higher prices. 
 There are two topics for future research suggested by our findings. First, it would be 
useful to know whether other information interventions have similar effects, so as to separate 
the message from the messenger. For example, information provided by Jamie Oliver may be 
especially salient for younger people. Our within-subject experimental design could be nested 
within a between-subject comparison, where various subjects received alternative information 
interventions. Second, it would be useful to examine the persistence of the demand reduction 
that results from the exposure to information about adverse health consequences of excessive 
consumption of sugary drinks.  
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Figure 1: The Interface Screen for Subjects to Record Their Choices 
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Figure 2: Total Number of Purchases and Total Spending, by Round 
(a) Number of purchases 
(b) Total Spending
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Description Price Quantity UnitPrice # of purchases # units bought Spending share
Coke 355ml can 1.80 0.355 5.07 389 651 0.05
Pepsi 355 ml can 1.50 0.355 4.23 271 400 0.02
Classic Cola 355ml can 1.00 0.355 2.82 609 1242 0.05
Diet Coke 355 ml can 1.80 0.355 5.07 303 514 0.04
Pepsi Max 355 ml can 1.50 0.355 4.23 413 731 0.05
Bundaberg Lemon, Lime, Bitters 375m 2.99 0.375 7.97 549 850 0.10
7 Up 600ml bottle 2.70 0.600 4.50 249 391 0.04
Sprite 600ml bottle 3.49 0.600 5.82 144 184 0.02
Lift+ 250 ml can 1.99 0.250 7.96 590 1160 0.10
Red Bull 250 ml can 2.79 0.250 11.16 91 123 0.01
V 500ml can 3.39 0.500 6.78 151 299 0.04
Mother Red 500 ml can 1.99 0.500 3.98 723 2429 0.21
V 500ml bottle 3.69 0.500 7.38 160 225 0.03
Red Bull 4-pack of 250 ml can 7.50 1.000 7.50 501 810 0.23
Table 1: Details on the Drinks in the Experiment
Note: Price is the going market price at the time the items were selected while prices in the experiment varied around this pricing 
point, quantity is in liters, unit price is per liter. The number of purchase times, the number of units bought, and the share of total 
spending are calculated over all rounds and all pricing structures. Drinks in the table are in the order shown in the experiment.
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Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Difference Std Error % reduction
All drinks 0.0559 0.0010 0.0396 0.0008 0.0163 0.0010 17.16 29.2%
Regular colas 0.0709 0.0024 0.0390 0.0018 0.0319 0.0023 14.01 45.1%
Classic Cola 0.0997 0.0048 0.0584 0.0038 0.0413 0.0046 8.99 41.4%
Coca Cola 0.0660 0.0040 0.0351 0.0030 0.0309 0.0036 8.51 46.9%
Pepsi  0.0470 0.0034 0.0234 0.0024 0.0236 0.0035 6.69 50.3%
Diet colas 0.0523 0.0025 0.0406 0.0023 0.0117 0.0027 4.29 22.3%
Diet Coke 0.0390 0.0031 0.0397 0.0031 -0.0008 0.0038 0.21 -2.0%
Pepsi Max 0.0657 0.0040 0.0416 0.0032 0.0242 0.0039 6.12 36.8%
Lemonades 0.0476 0.0020 0.0339 0.0017 0.0137 0.0019 7.20 28.7%
Energy drinks 0.0536 0.0015 0.0423 0.0013 0.0113 0.0014 8.27 21.1%
All drinks 48.11 1.24 35.88 1.13 12.22 1.05 11.68 25.4%
Regular colas 46.78 2.31 23.70 1.36 23.08 2.10 11.01 49.3%
Classic Cola 76.16 5.64 38.36 3.00 37.81 5.23 7.22 49.6%
Coca Cola 39.37 3.14 20.65 2.06 18.72 2.73 6.85 47.5%
Pepsi  24.80 2.43 12.08 1.83 12.72 2.14 5.94 51.3%
Diet colas 31.72 2.36 25.68 2.26 6.04 2.51 2.41 19.0%
Diet Coke 20.10 2.33 27.29 3.26 -7.19 3.61 1.99 -35.8%
Pepsi Max 43.34 4.09 24.07 3.12 19.27 3.47 5.55 44.5%
Lemonades 34.10 1.72 23.36 1.51 10.74 1.75 6.13 31.5%
Energy drinks 61.23 2.38 51.63 2.30 9.60 1.84 5.21 15.7%
All drinks 25.05 0.64 18.99 0.58 6.07 0.54 11.19 24.2%
Regular colas 17.39 0.86 8.86 0.53 8.53 0.79 10.79 49.0%
Classic Cola 21.98 1.69 11.82 1.00 10.16 1.59 6.41 46.2%
Coca Cola 19.91 1.67 9.99 1.04 9.93 1.49 6.66 49.8%
Pepsi  10.28 1.01 4.78 0.68 5.50 0.94 5.86 53.5%
Diet colas 13.73 1.04 11.06 0.95 2.67 1.12 2.38 19.5%
Diet Coke 9.45 1.09 12.37 1.46 -2.92 1.63 1.80 -30.9%
Pepsi Max 18.01 1.77 9.74 1.21 8.27 1.54 5.37 45.9%
Lemonades 20.27 1.02 13.61 0.85 6.66 0.98 6.78 32.9%
Energy drinks 35.05 1.28 29.38 1.21 5.67 1.03 5.50 16.2%
Note: Statistically insignificant t-test values (at p <0.05) are in italics
Table 2: Effects on Soft Drink Purchases of Watching Jamie Oliver Sugar Rush  Video, by Drink Type
Proportion of possible purchase opportunities with a purchase made
Unconditional average spending (cents) on drinks across every possible purchase opportunity
Before watching video After watching video Paired 
t-test
Unconditional average quantity (ml) of drinks purchased (including zero) per purchase opportunity
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Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Difference Std Error % reduction
Baseline prices 0.0605 0.0027 0.0401 0.0022 0.0204 0.0026 7.93 33.7%
Ad valorem  tax 20% 0.0391 0.0022 0.0242 0.0017 0.0149 0.0021 7.11 38.2%
Ad valorem  tax 40% 0.0300 0.0019 0.0204 0.0016 0.0096 0.0019 5.07 32.0%
Price cut of 20% 0.1074 0.0035 0.0813 0.0031 0.0261 0.0034 7.58 24.3%
Specific tax, $0.50/liter 0.0434 0.0023 0.0312 0.0020 0.0122 0.0022 5.49 28.1%
Specific tax, $1.00/liter 0.0364 0.0021 0.0247 0.0018 0.0117 0.0021 5.68 32.1%
Price cut of $0.50/liter 0.0743 0.0030 0.0551 0.0026 0.0192 0.0029 6.57 25.9%
Baseline prices 51.65 3.41 36.17 3.08 15.49 2.87 5.39 30.0%
Ad valorem  tax 20% 32.12 2.67 21.23 2.21 10.89 2.13 5.12 33.9%
Ad valorem  tax 40% 24.20 2.20 16.87 1.84 7.33 2.00 3.67 30.3%
Price cut of 20% 95.63 4.58 75.77 4.31 19.86 3.86 5.15 20.8%
Specific tax, $0.50/liter 36.13 2.75 27.99 2.64 8.14 2.23 3.65 22.5%
Specific tax, $1.00/liter 27.87 2.30 20.54 2.08 7.33 1.85 3.96 26.3%
Price cut of $0.50/liter 69.14 4.19 52.60 3.76 16.54 3.70 4.48 23.9%
Baseline prices 27.01 1.78 19.11 1.53 7.90 1.53 5.18 29.3%
Ad valorem  tax 20% 17.95 1.41 12.50 1.22 5.45 1.21 4.49 30.3%
Ad valorem  tax 40% 16.00 1.41 11.49 1.24 4.51 1.30 3.48 28.2%
Price cut of 20% 45.42 2.21 36.65 2.10 8.77 1.73 5.07 19.3%
Specific tax, $0.50/liter 19.87 1.49 15.31 1.37 4.56 1.33 3.43 23.0%
Specific tax, $1.00/liter 16.73 1.34 12.56 1.23 4.17 1.10 3.78 24.9%
Price cut of $0.50/liter 32.39 1.96 25.28 1.78 7.11 1.72 4.14 22.0%
Unconditional average spending (cents) on drinks across every possible purchase opportunity
Table 3: Effects on Soft Drink Purchases of Watching Jamie Oliver Sugar Rush  Video, by Pricing Structure
Before watching video After watching video Paired 
t-test
Proportion of possible purchase opportunities with a purchase made
Unconditional average quantity (ml) of drinks purchased (including zero) per purchase opportunity
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Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Difference Std Error
Female 0.0550 0.0013 0.0321 0.0010 0.0229 0.0013 18.13 8.22
Male 0.0571 0.0015 0.0500 0.0015 0.0071 0.0014 4.95
Younger 0.0569 0.0014 0.0403 0.0012 0.0166 0.0013 12.62 0.33
Older 0.0548 0.0014 0.0388 0.0021 0.0160 0.0014 11.68
Less educated 0.0670 0.0016 0.0489 0.0014 0.0181 0.0015 11.95 1.82
More educated 0.0459 0.0012 0.0312 0.0010 0.0147 0.0012 12.41
Buy more soda 0.0725 0.0015 0.0522 0.0012 0.0203 0.0014 14.46 5.03
Buy less soda 0.0319 0.0012 0.0213 0.0010 0.0106 0.0011 9.32
Don't check sugar 0.0672 0.0016 0.0486 0.0014 0.0185 0.0015 12.00 2.06
Do check sugar 0.0471 0.0012 0.0325 0.0010 0.0146 0.0012 12.27
Video would alter 0.0495 0.0012 0.0276 0.0009 0.0219 0.0012 18.41 7.62
Video not alter 0.0666 0.0018 0.0597 0.0017 0.0069 0.0016 4.39
Female 35.66 1.08 21.42 0.84 14.24 1.01 14.09 2.27
Male 65.42 2.55 56.00 2.42 9.42 2.07 4.55
Younger 58.55 2.07 42.81 1.84 15.74 1.65 9.55 3.35
Older 37.67 1.37 28.95 1.30 8.71 1.29 6.74
Less educated 61.86 2.15 47.07 1.98 14.79 1.80 8.23 2.32
More educated 35.78 1.34 25.86 1.18 9.92 1.16 8.56
Buy more soda 65.44 1.93 50.03 1.79 15.41 1.61 9.58 3.66
Buy less soda 23.08 1.16 15.45 0.93 7.63 1.07 7.10
Don't check sugar 58.07 2.07 42.46 1.78 15.61 1.76 8.85 2.85
Do check sugar 40.39 1.51 30.79 1.44 9.60 1.26 7.62
Video would alter 35.71 1.20 20.23 0.93 15.48 1.14 13.62 4.03
Video not alter 68.97 2.64 62.22 2.58 6.75 2.06 3.28
Female 18.52 0.59 11.40 0.46 7.12 0.53 13.32 2.30
Male 34.14 1.29 29.55 1.22 4.60 1.06 4.33
Younger 29.92 1.01 21.99 0.89 7.93 0.83 9.58 3.43
Older 20.19 0.79 15.98 0.74 4.21 0.70 6.00
Less educated 31.71 1.05 24.51 0.96 7.19 0.92 7.79 1.97
More educated 19.09 0.76 14.03 0.67 5.05 0.61 8.29
Buy more soda 34.51 0.99 26.90 0.92 7.61 0.83 9.17 3.43
Buy less soda 11.39 0.62 7.56 0.48 3.83 0.56 6.79
Don't check sugar 30.47 1.03 22.62 0.89 7.85 0.89 8.85 2.89
Do check sugar 20.86 0.80 16.17 0.76 4.69 0.67 6.96
Video would alter 17.31 0.58 9.94 0.45 7.37 0.56 13.10 3.11
Video not alter 38.08 1.40 34.21 1.34 3.88 1.11 3.51
Unconditional average spending (cents) on drinks across every possible purchase opportunity
Diff-in-diff
t-test
Notes:  Tabulated characteristics have statistically significant (p <0.05) difference-in-differences for at least two of: any 
purchases, quantity purchased, and total spending. Statistically insignificant t-values are in italics.  Young is based on age <24, 
less educated on school years <15, buying more soda on spending  $5 per week (break points are the sample medians), 
check sugar is based on whether the subject makes purchase decisions based on sugar content, and 'video had no effect' is 
based on the subject's rating of the impact of the Sugar Rush  video on themselves, prior to rounds 6 to 10 of the experiment.
Table 4: Heterogeneity in Effects on Soft Drink Purchases of Watching Jamie Oliver Sugar Rush  Video 
Before watching video After watching video Paired 
t-test
Proportion of possible purchase opportunities with a purchase made
Unconditional average quantity (ml) of drinks purchased (including zero) per purchase opportunity
